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Industria/OT-NIS27 min

ScreenConnect Attacks on MSPs: When the Provider's Tool Opens the Door to the Customer

If your IT provider connects to your machines with a remote access tool and that tool falls into the wrong hands, the attacker walks in through the same door. What happened with ScreenConnect and what is worth reviewing in your company.

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Gorka GonzaloFounder & CEO
Isometric illustration of a network of nodes in which a provider's remote access channel connects to a customer's machines, on the theme of ScreenConnect attacks on MSPs.

ScreenConnect attacks on MSPs show how attackers can use compromised ScreenConnect environments to deploy unauthorized remote access clients on customer devices.

According to BleepingComputer, citing the cybersecurity firm Huntress, the campaign had reached 286 endpoints across 47 organizations at the time the information was published [1]. The idea running through this article is simple: your providers' remote access is part of your attack surface, and treating it as the provider's problem alone leaves open a door you do not control.

The ScreenConnect campaign uses the provider's legitimate access to reach the customer

ScreenConnect is a remote access and support platform that many managed service providers (MSPs) and IT departments use to administer and troubleshoot their customers' machines. According to BleepingComputer, ConnectWise, the vendor, is investigating an active campaign aimed at these providers that takes advantage of compromised ScreenConnect environments to install unauthorized remote access clients on end customers' devices [1]. It is, in effect, an MSP supply chain attack: the customer is reached through the provider.

Explained plainly, the mechanism is this. Huntress describes attackers using the platform's own command execution function to deploy parallel ScreenConnect clients on managed machines, which gives them remote access that sits outside the provider's legitimate environment [1]. In this campaign, the attackers use compromised ScreenConnect environments to deploy unauthorized remote access clients on managed machines.

The source also describes a technique that researchers consider potentially more dangerous: compromising a provider technician's workstation when the technician opens a remote session with an already infected customer machine [1]. In a security advisory, ConnectWise confirmed unauthorized access to partner accounts and the installation of unauthorized remote access software in customer environments, and it notes that reports of technician workstations compromised during interactive sessions are still being verified [1].

The figures are best read as a snapshot. According to BleepingComputer, Huntress warned that the number of victims was still growing and that certain sequential identifiers assigned by the attackers suggest other providers may have been compromised earlier [1].

Third-party extensions widen the platform's attack surface

An important part of the vendor's response concerns not the base product but what is added to it. BleepingComputer reports that, as a preventive containment measure, ConnectWise disabled several independent third-party extensions in its cloud-hosted partner environments because of their possible link to the attacks: Labtech Plus, RMM Plus, RMM+, RMM Plus Password Link and RMM+ Password Link [1]. These extensions are installed from the marketplace built into the ScreenConnect administration console.

This detail has to be read precisely. The vendor itself stresses that having those extensions installed does not necessarily mean a network is compromised, that the investigation remains open, and that disabling them does not remove the software, the persistence or the access the attacker may already have left on affected machines [1]. It also warns that on-premises installations, customers must disable them manually themselves [1].

A consequence follows for anyone who hires the provider. In this case, ConnectWise is investigating the possible link between five third-party extensions and the attacks. It is worth asking your MSP which extensions it has active.

What the sources say about CVE-2025-3935 and the current campaign

It is important to tell apart the events described in the sources and their dates. On 2 June 2025, the US cybersecurity agency CISA added CVE-2025-3935, described as an improper authentication vulnerability in ConnectWise ScreenConnect, to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog, based on evidence of active exploitation [2].

BleepingComputer reports Huntress's assessment that the activity appears to abuse legitimate features rather than exploit a software vulnerability. A threat intelligence lead at Huntress told BleepingComputer that the activity appears to be abuse of legitimate functionality, not exploitation of a software flaw, and the firm's telemetry points to compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions as the way in [1].

The practical lesson is twofold. Following the KEV catalog helps prioritize patches, and CISA encourages any organization to use it as part of its vulnerability management, even though the directive that created it applies only to US federal civilian executive branch agencies [2]. In this campaign, Huntress points to possible abuse of legitimate functionality and an entry route based on compromised credentials or hijacked operator sessions.

An industrial SME inherits its provider's way in

For an industrial SME that outsources its IT, the relevant question is a different one: what could someone who controls the tool your provider uses to enter your machines do with it?

The answer, as editorial reasoning, is that they could do the same as the provider. If the MSP administers the office computers, the servers or the workstations that connect to the plant, it is worth reviewing what privileges it has and what a compromise of its remote tool could lead to. In a production environment, it is worth assessing what consequences that access could have for business continuity.

For that reason, third-party access cannot sit outside a company's risk inventory. Knowing which providers get in, with which tools and how far they reach is the starting point of digital supply chain risk management, and it is also what lets you react when the problem starts outside your walls. These remote access tool security risks belong in that inventory.

What to review in your providers' remote access

The short answer is this: review which remote access tools each provider uses, who can connect and with what privileges, how they authenticate, which remote clients or extensions are installed on your machines, and how the provider would notify you if its environment were compromised. From there, these are the checks that, in the editorial team's judgment, are worth having covered:

  1. Inventory of tools and of providers with access. A living list of which company gets in, with which software and to which machines.
  2. Least privilege and named accounts. Each technician with their own account and only the permissions they need, with no shared generic accounts.
  3. Multifactor authentication and access restrictions. Limit connections by origin or time window where the service allows it.
  4. Inventory of installed remote clients. Know which remote access agents are on your machines and get an alert for any that nobody recognizes.
  5. Incident notification clause. The contract should oblige the provider to tell you about its own incidents and about the tools it uses.
  6. Ability to cut access quickly. Being able to disable the provider's connection without depending on the provider.

As a useful reference for the conversation with your MSP, ConnectWise asked its partners to review authentication logs, extension installations, administrative activity and command execution history for suspicious activity [1]. Asking your provider whether it has done so is a concrete way to start.

Detecting a remote client nobody installed requires continuous monitoring

In this campaign, unauthorized ScreenConnect clients are deployed that provide access outside the MSP's legitimate environment. The attackers use these unauthorized, trojanized ScreenConnect clients to obtain remote access. SC Media reported in October 2025, based on a report from the DarkAtlas research project, intrusions that used the ScreenConnect console to create invitation links in phishing campaigns and get victims to install malicious clients that were then registered as a Windows service [3].

It is worth checking not only which program appears but also whether its installation was authorized. In the current campaign, according to BleepingComputer, Huntress began receiving alerts precisely when unauthorized ScreenConnect clients appeared on the endpoints it monitored [1]. That is the difference between knowing what is normal in each environment and merely trusting the approved software list.

The response also has nuances. ConnectWise recommends not opening interactive ScreenConnect sessions with possibly compromised machines and using independent security tools to investigate them [1]. For a company without its own monitoring team, it is worth considering which service could cover endpoint monitoring and the investigation of unexpected activity.

Verifying your providers' access is managing the supply chain, not distrusting it

The ScreenConnect case invites a closer look at the dependence on providers' remote access. It is worth knowing, limiting and being able to cut your providers' remote access as part of risk management.

Asking for transparency about tools and extensions, setting by contract how and when they will notify you, and reviewing access periodically is not a sign of distrust toward the MSP; it is the same discipline applied to any other critical link in the supply chain. If your company is also considering how this fits into its regulatory obligations, it is worth confirming the specific scope in your case with legal counsel.

Sources

  1. Active ScreenConnect attacks breach MSPs, impact dozens of organizations — BleepingComputer, 2026-11-11
  2. CISA Adds Five Known Exploited Vulnerabilities to Catalog — CISA, 2025-06-02
  3. Network compromise via ConnectWise ScreenConnect abuse ramps up — SC Media, 2025-10-14

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Photo of Gorka Gonzalo

Gorka Gonzalo

Founder & CEO

Founded Hodeitek in 2023 and runs the company, after more than 8 years in pentesting, Red Team, OT/ICS auditing, and SOC leadership. A cybersecurity and AI expert, he sets the technical and product direction of HodeiShield and personally leads the most critical engagements — from defense strategy to applying AI in threat detection. He is the client's direct point of contact: whoever scopes the work also answers for the result.