Alpine Linux OpenSSH vulnerability: how to skip the password and how to tell if you are affected
An unusually long password can open accounts that use only an SSH key on certain Alpine Linux servers. What matters is checking whether your systems meet the conditions for the flaw, and updating.


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The Alpine Linux OpenSSH vulnerability contains a paradox: an account with no password, protected only by an SSH key, could be opened by typing an absurdly long password. A patch is available, but the headline alone does not tell you whether you are affected.
Exposure depends on a specific combination of configuration and accounts that is worth checking on every image. That is why priority should be decided by checking those conditions, not by reading the severity label.
A very long password opens accounts that have no password
According to The Hacker News, on some Alpine Linux servers running the standard openssh-server package, an attacker can log in to accounts without a password if three requirements are met: they have network access to the server, they know the name of one of those accounts, and they send a password much longer than usual [1]. The exposed accounts are precisely the ones considered most locked down. The same outlet lists among them users who sign in only with a key, the root account of the base image, and the alpine user of the official cloud images built with tiny-cloud [1].
The origin is a logic flaw between two pieces that looked correct on their own. The Hacker News explains that, without PAM (Pluggable Authentication Modules), sshd checks the password itself. When an account has only an asterisk in the password field, sshd borrows the salt of another account that does have a real hash [1]. That borrowing comes from an OpenSSH change dated 15 July 2016 that fixed CVE-2016-6210. For its part, the crypt() function in musl, the C library Alpine is built on, rejects passwords that are too long in $5$ and $6$ hashes and returns an asterisk as an error signal. That asterisk matches the stored one, and sshd accepts the login [1]. Neither behaviour is new: the musl one goes back to changes from August 2012 [1].
The response was quick. The Hacker News reports that OpenSSH rates the flaw as critical, that it published version 10.6p2 to block it as an OpenSSH emergency fix, and that Alpine shipped corrected packages for all its versions from 3.16 onwards [1]. The following day, according to INCIBE-CERT, advisory INCIBE-2026-842 was published, dated 6 November 2026. The advisory credits the discovery to Özgün Kültekin, of Wakefield, and records the flaw as CVE-2026-123158 [2]. At the time of its publication, The Hacker News noted that no CVE identifier had yet been assigned [1].
The flaw is only exploitable when three conditions coincide
Here is the part the headline leaves out. INCIBE-CERT places the problem in Alpine Linux 3.16 to 3.24 and in the edge branch, with OpenSSH packages older than those containing the fix, and only when all of the following conditions occur at the same time [2]:
| Condition | How to check it |
|---|---|
| sshd validates passwords without PAM | Check whether openssh-server is installed, which is compiled without PAM, or openssh-server-pam with UsePAM no |
| Password authentication is enabled | Review the effective sshd configuration with sshd -T and find the value of passwordauthentication |
There is an account with * in the password field and another local account with a $5$ or $6$ hash | Review /etc/shadow: asterisks on some accounts and hashes starting with $5$ or $6$ on others |
The Hacker News adds nuances that matter. Alpine's openssh-server package ships without PAM and password authentication is on by default, so the first two conditions are met without anyone having changed anything [1]. In addition, a single account with a password is enough to expose all the accounts that have none [1]. Root is protected by the default setting PermitRootLogin prohibit-password, but that barrier falls if an exposed account can become root, for example through doas. That is what happens with the tiny-cloud images from 3.18.11 to 3.24.3, which give the alpine user passwordless doas [1].
If any one of the conditions fails, the attack does not work. According to the same outlet, systems with PasswordAuthentication no, accounts locked with ! in /etc/shadow, and machines where no account has a hash with a $ prefix are not vulnerable [1]. This helps you understand your exposure, but it does not replace the patch: a configuration can change tomorrow with a simple console setting.
In images and containers the risk lies in what you inherit
The sources discuss Alpine versions and sshd configuration. What follows is Hodeitek's analysis based on those data. Alpine is the base of many Docker images; it is worth reviewing the conditions of the flaw in each image.
The Hacker News sets out the scope: containers that do not run sshd are not affected, and neither are cloud images configured through cloud-init, because it writes the setting that disables passwords [1]. In images that do run sshd, it is worth checking whether the conditions of the flaw apply.
What to review in base images and deployments
- Which Alpine version and which openssh package version each base image or template ships, comparing it with the fixed version that INCIBE-CERT gives for its branch [2].
- Whether openssh-server is installed because it is needed or is a leftover from a reused image.
- Whether
PasswordAuthenticationis still active in the inherited configuration, includingMatchblocks. - Whether accounts with
*and accounts with a$5$or$6$hash coexist, for example after setting a console password.
It is worth checking the host update and the update of each image separately. It is worth verifying which package version each image includes before redeploying it. To find out which systems are really exposed, and not just which ones might be, it can be useful to validate with a penetration test which systems are actually exposed.
Exposure and conditions, not just the severity label, should drive patch priority
The assessments do not fully match. OpenSSH rates the flaw as critical, according to The Hacker News [1], and INCIBE-CERT assigns it high importance [2]. The difference in label does not change what needs to be done: update to the corrected Alpine packages, with OpenSSH 10.6p2 as the reference version for anyone who builds the software themselves [1].
The practical detail most often overlooked is the restart. Both sources state that, after installing the package, the service must be restarted with rc-service sshd restart; The Hacker News explains that the update does not restart the sshd that is already running [1][2]. The Hacker News specifies that the point releases 3.21.10, 3.22.8, 3.23.8 and 3.24.4 already include the corrected package [1]. If the update has to wait, INCIBE-CERT recommends first verifying that key-based access works, setting PasswordAuthentication no in the effective configuration, and restarting the service [2].
As an ordering criterion, it is worth starting with systems reachable over the network that have password authentication enabled and key-only accounts or an easy escalation to root, and continuing with the rest afterwards. On exploitation, the INCIBE-CERT advisory marks it as not observed [2], and The Hacker News says no attacks have been reported [1]. That leaves no room to wait. The same outlet records a warning from Damien Miller of OpenSSH: long embargoes mainly help attackers, because his team has seen AI agents rediscover the same flaws, sometimes within hours [1]. Even so, there is no public evidence yet of this OpenSSH vulnerability being exploited, which is a reason to patch before that changes.
Checking configuration and watching access closes the gap the patch leaves
This Alpine Linux SSH password bypass is avoided by checking, on every image and server, the package version, the SSH configuration and the accounts, and updating wherever the conditions coincide. There is no need to wait for a headline to mention your environment.
After the patch, a deeper question remains: whether password authentication is really necessary on those systems. There is also the doubt of whether someone got in beforehand. The Hacker News reports that the Alpine Linux security advisory suggests searching /var/log/messages for sshd lines with "Accepted password" for accounts without a password. On exposed machines, it is also worth reviewing doas usage, recently created users, files and authorised keys. If an intrusion cannot be ruled out, the advisory asks that the machine be treated as compromised [1].
As our own inference, SSH login attempts with passwords of anomalous length are a signal worth watching. For those without in-house capacity for continuous review, managed monitoring and alert response can cover that gap. If you suspect an incident, INCIBE offers Tu Ayuda en Ciberseguridad, a free and confidential service for citizens, businesses and professionals [3]. To receive upcoming INCIBE-CERT advisories, you can subscribe to its bulletins [4].
Sources
- OpenSSH Issues Emergency Fix for Flaw Letting Long Passwords Bypass SSH Auth on Alpine Linux — The Hacker News, 2026-11-05
- Omisión de autenticación por contraseña en OpenSSH de Alpine Linux — INCIBE-CERT, 2026-11-06
- Tu Ayuda en Ciberseguridad — INCIBE
- Suscripción a boletines de INCIBE — INCIBE
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Gorka Gonzalo
Founder & CEO
Founded Hodeitek in 2023 and runs the company, after more than 8 years in pentesting, Red Team, OT/ICS auditing, and SOC leadership. A cybersecurity and AI expert, he sets the technical and product direction of HodeiShield and personally leads the most critical engagements — from defense strategy to applying AI in threat detection. He is the client's direct point of contact: whoever scopes the work also answers for the result.